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Prof. B R Deepak invited to lecture at China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) & Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Beijing

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On June 17th and 25th, 2015 Prof. B R Deepak was invited to lecture at the prestigious China Foreign Affairs University (CFAU) and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing respectively.

Founded in 1955, the CFAU is considered to have produced many eminent diplomats and politicians in China; some of the notable alumni are present foreign Minister and Vice Premier Wang Yi, Jiang Yu, current Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, and Dai Bingguo, former special representative for border negotiations with India. CASS, which was founded in 1977, on the other hand is the largest think tank, has over 30 research institutes under its auspices and is under the direct control of the State Council.



Prof. Deepak 4th from left at CFAU

CFAU lecture was chaired by Professor Lu Jing, Director, Institute of International Relations. Prof. Deepak's lecture titled 'India's Foreign Policy Under Prime Minister Modi: India on Global Political, Economic Map?' expounded the

characteristic of the NaMo style foreign policy, the fundamentals of the Indian foreign policy, India's perceptions about the world order and the role it envisages for itself in it. It concluded that India's role as the 'definer' of the rules would be determined by domestic economic and political drivers.



Prof. Deepak 2nd from left with some of the participants at CASS

At CASS Prof. Deepak spoke on the 'BCIM and the security environment in the region' at the sideline of an International seminar on BCIM's Investment Climate on FDI in Electricity Infrastructure organized by the Division of International Economic Relations, National Institute of International Strategy (NIIS). The session was chaired by Prof. Zhao Jianglin, Director, Department of International Economic Relations, NIIS, CASS. During the proceedings Prof. Deepak also Chaired Session II titled "FDI in BCIM's Electricity Infrastructure: Opportunities and Challenges" of the Seminar.

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Faculty Focus

Dr. Hemant Adlakha participated in a 2-day International Conference entitled “Continuities and Discontinuities: Comparative Reflections between China and India”, held at the Collège de France, Paris, 25-26 June, 2015.

The Collège de France, established in 1530, has been the Parisian sanctuary where major events of the history of Oriental studies occurred. In the 16th and 17th centuries, scholars of this prestigious institution had a first glimpse successively on the civilizations of different parts of Asia. In the 18th century adventurers for the sole sake of knowledge went to the East collected and stored Oriental manuscripts and documents in Parisian libraries. At the start of 19th century contacts between scholars of France and India were well-established, sufficient documentation was available to give a scientific status to the study of Sanskrit and Chinese language and literature. It was consecrated by the creation of chairs of Sanskrit and Chinese in Collège de France, by a royal decree on the 29th of November 1814, confirmed by an imperial decision in 1815. Antoine Léonard Chézy pronounced his inaugural lecture about the Sanskrit literature on the 16th of January 1815.

At the occasion of the bicentenary of this event, a two-day Seminar was convened on the 25th-26th June 2015. On the opening day of the conference – the whole day was devoted to the Sanskrit Studies in France and in Western Europe – scholars from India, Germany and France presented in total 8 papers followed by open discussion with the audience. “Intellectual encounters between India and France, 17th-19th centuries”

The concluding day of the conference was focused on China studies and India, China comparative studies, and was held at- The Foundation Hugot of the Collège de France. The format of the second day deliberations was different from the first day and it was more like a workshop comprising of theme-based presentations followed by discussion among the participants.

As outlined by the Conference concept note China and India are at present most often compared in the context of the competition between the two “giants of Asia” or between two of the “emerging countries” (the famed BRICS). Scarce, however, are the comparative studies that take an interest in the respective resources (intellectual, cultural, societal) of these two countries which, in spite of the divergences and the geopolitical conflicts that keep them apart today, possess a number of common characteristics : spatial dimensions on the scale of a continent, a numerous population, but also a long history that can be traced back to highest antiquity,

and a civilization which has disseminated beyond their territory proper (in all of East Asia in the case of China, and to South-East Asia in the case of India).

It was in this context that the Chair of Chinese intellectual history in The Collège de France brought together French and Indian researchers, representing various disciplinary fields (historians, sinologists, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers), and expressed their diverse viewpoints on the question of the continuity and/or discontinuity (whether it be through recurrences, resurgences, reconstructions or revolutions and destructions) in the evolution of cultures and mindsets, notably regarding the more or less brutal, more or less controlled transition from a traditional world to a modern, or even globalized world.

Dr. Hemant Adlakha presented a paper titled “India, China and the West: Chewing or Eschewing of Modernity” Prof. Guillaume Dutournier and Prof. Anne Cheng were discussants for the paper.

Articles in Journals/web

Deepak, B R “China’s AIIB Luxury Coach on the ‘Belt and Road’ and India” C3S Paper No. 0135/ 30 June 2015 <http://www.c3sindia.org/india/5104>

Deepak, B R “Zhou Yongkang Verdict: Corruption Crackdown or political struggle?” C3S Paper No. 0128/ 15 June 2015 <http://www.c3sindia.org/china/5091>

Deepak, B R “Sino-US rivalry in South-China Sea: A New Normal? C3S Paper No. 0124/ 08 June 2015 <http://www.c3sindia.org/china/5080>

Deepak, B R “Modi’s China visit: Can India and China think differently?” C3S Paper No. 0109/ 12 May 2015 <http://www.c3sindia.org/uncategorized/5032>

Chapters in Books

Deepak, B R “Interpreter of the Chinese Dream” Bobb, Dilip ed. (2015) The Best of TEL [The Equator Line] New Delhi, Palimset Publishers

China’s AIIB ‘Luxury Coach’, ‘Belt and Road’ and India; By Prof. B. R. Deepak

June 30, 2015 C3S Paper No. 0135/ 2015

Yesterday in Beijing, 50 founding members of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) signed the Bank’s Article of Agreement (AoA) and laid ground rules for officially inaugurating the Bank, thought to be challenging Bretton Woods financial institutions

like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). There are seven more prospective founding members that will sign the agreement once approved by their domestic legislatures. *People's Daily*, the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China reported that 57 'passengers' are ready to board the 'luxury coach' of AIIB valued at \$100 billion.

The size of the shares has been in accordance with the GDP strength of respective countries. 70-75 per cent of the shares would be held by the Asian countries, while 25-30 per cent could be allocated to non Asian countries. China has contributed USD 29.78 billion making it the largest shareholder with 26.06 per cent of the total votes, enabling China to be the sole veto power. However, the analysts are of the view that China may not exercise this veto in actual functioning of the Bank. As speculated, China will be the president of the bank, however, countries like India and Russia may settle for vice presidency of the Bank. China had earlier proposed the idea of 'one president and 10 vice presidents'.

The importance of the AIIB lies in the fact that it is the outcome of the Bretton Woods System that has been on shaky grounds after the 2008-09 financial crises as well as the present Greece debt crises, a reminder that if the institutions like IMF, the WB and ADB continue to attach strings to the developmental aids and loans, there is going to be a serious demand for alternative institutions like AIIB. Especially when the global economic recovery is weak, the establishment of such institutions will promote infrastructural as well as social and economic development in the regions. Even if AIIB does not challenge the existing financial institutions, it would be seen as complementing the existing order.

China has all along argued that the AIIB would be an inclusive, open and constructive multilateral institutions, it would be a collaborative project aimed to achieve mutual benefits and a platform for providing financial assistance to various regional, sub regional and trans-regional infrastructural development. More importantly, China has linked the AIIB to President Xi Jinping's 'Belt and Road' initiative that intend to link Asia to Europe by land and sea routes. Like the 'Belt and Road' initiative the idea of AIIB was also floated by President Xi Jinping in October 2013 while visiting Southeast Asian countries. A year later on the sidelines of the APEC meeting, 21 Asian countries signed the MOU of setting up such a bank, India being one of them.

Being the founder member of the AIIB and BRICS Development Bank, and likely to enter the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) shortly, can India afford to have an error of judgement as regards the 'Belt and Road' initiative of China in the same way the US did in the case of AIIB? Ignoring US's 'concerns' about 'accommodating China', today half of the European Union has joined the

AIIB, and many more countries are likely to follow the suit in coming time. However, how do we proceed?

First and foremost, India has been the part of 'Belt and Road' initiative by way of signing Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar – Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC), more importantly the corridor is not only the part of Silk Road Economic Belt but also the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. India has been going slow on the corridor owing to problems such as insurgency, rebels finding sanctuary in Kachin and Kokang areas of Myanmar where China has a definite strong influence, narco-arm nexus in the region, terrorism and refugees etc. issues. These are harsh realities in the region, where India needs to deliver on social development while tackling these complex issues. However, since the issues proliferate to other BCIM countries, India must adopt a bilateral or multilateral approach. The best way forward would be a BCIM *joint security mechanism* under the ambit of which one and all issues pertaining to security could be discussed and resolved.

On the other hand, if the 'Belt and Road' initiative serves China's overcapacity, new technologies like bullet trains and rich cash rightly, it also provides opportunities for developing countries in Asia to overhaul their infrastructure and develop capacities. Moreover, even if the initiative is a counter to 'US pivot to Asia', taking sides may prove costly for India from either perspective; therefore, India needs to calibrate its policy keeping its national interests and goals in mind. If the "Belt and Road" plan offers great opportunities for India, the US Silk Road Strategy and Russia's Eurasian integration strategy is equally attractive; India must have multiple options to take advantage of the different integration projects going on in Asia and Central Asia.

Furthermore, if China has been assertive in the Indian Ocean, so must be India in our immediate and extended neighbourhood. That said, it does not mean that India cannot cooperate with China on Maritime Silk Route. In fact MSR offers immense opportunities for India to develop our infrastructure in coastal areas and build world class facilities with the help of new financial institutions like AIIB, BRICS Development Bank and Silk Road Fund. In this context Prime Minister Modi's vision of 'Bharat Mala' and 'Sagar Mala' should be in sync with the 'Belt and Road' projects. Not only this, China says that 'project Mausam' and 'spice route' could also form part of the 'Belt and Road' plan.

Finally, irrespective of India on board or not, China will continue to go global. The conclusion of various free trade agreements (FTA) with nations across continents is going on a brisk pace, Australia-China FTA being the latest one. There are concerns about overstretching Chinese capacities and capabilities even within China, however, China has resolved to go ahead with the vision, for China believes that SREB and MSR is going to be important drivers of regional as well as global economic growth, for it encompasses a population of 4.4 billion with a collective GDP of USD 21 trillion, which is seen as an opportunity to transform its

pattern of economic development as well as the optimization of its economic structure. If India has welcomed and joined initiatives such as BRICS Development Bank and AIIB, there would be no harm in joining the Belt and Road initiative.

Zhou Yongkang Verdict: Corruption crackdown or political struggle? By Prof. B. R. Deepak

June 15, 2015 C3S Paper No. 0128/ 2015

In a closed door trial in Tianjin on 22 May 2015, Zhou Yongkang, China's former security chief and member of the Communist Party's Standing Committee of Political Bureau until his retirement in 2012, was sentenced to life imprisonment, which was announced only on 11 June. With this Zhou has become the highest-level communist official being convicted after the 'Gang of Four' at the close of the Cultural Revolution. He has been convicted of taking bribes amounting to \$21.3 million. Many of his family members and those who benefited from his stature have been named and are being tried. After hearing the quantum of punishment, Chinese media have reported that Zhou has pleaded guilty and remorseful his wrongdoings.

Why has the trial been kept secret? There are clamors that high level state secrets are involved; two, to avoid external interference; and three, to prevent the case going out of control. The court ruled out that revealing of the five 'extremely confidential' and one 'confidential' document did not have any serious consequences; if so, the analysts believe that these are pointer to hordes of internal Party secrets, as Zhou had direct access to these while at the helm of country's internal security, the budget of which exceeds that of the PLA's. Also, he had been in the Political and Law Committee of the CPC for fourteen long years.

On March 18th Supreme People's Court in its White paper, the 6th one since 2010, indicted Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai of 'Non organizational Political Activities' (非组织政治活动) generating fears that Zhou may get harsher punishment, and also a pointer that even super tigers such as Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong may be the next targets of Xi Jinping's corruption campaign. Also, not giving Zhou harsher punishment would mean that Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) requires Zhou for revealing details of other 'tigers' and 'flies' behind the scene whom the commission is intending to investigate for 'serious disciplinary violations' an euphemism for corruption.

Other people who have been indicted include Jiang Jiemin, China National Petroleum Corporation's (CNPC) Party chief between 2006 and 12; Wu Bing, who allegedly served as proxy in business for Zhou Yongkang's son Zhou Bin; Ding Xuefeng, former mayor of Lüliang, Shanxi Province; Wen Qingshan, former chief accountant of the CNPC; and Zhou Hao, former Party chief of Liaohe oilfield in Northeast China.

It may be reminded that after ascending to power in late 2012, Xi Jinping put a check to official extravagance, lavish official banquets, foreign leisure travels by officials, exchange of gifts etc. and pledged to take on 'flies and tigers' alike. The crackdown on corruption has been interpreted in many ways inside China. The official interpretation is that since the legitimacy of the Communist Party is at stake, President Xi has no other alternative but to clean the party from within. Other popular discourse is that this is a power struggle within the Party; the crackdown is just a mean to silent the opponents, as is evident from the white paper issued by the Supreme People's Court indicting Bo Xilai and Zhou for engaging in 'anti organizational activities.'

Even though Bo Xilai was proved during the fag end of Hu Jintao's regime, however, his close associates have been proved under Xi. It is amply clear that over ambitious Bo, a princeling pitching him against another princeling, could not have the sway as he wished for the top post in China. Moreover, Zhou and Bo are allegedly said to have met several times when Bo was heading the CPC in Chongqing. It is believed that it was Zhou who apprised Bo about Wang Lijun's asylum in US consulate in Chengdu, which lead the lid off British businessman Haywood's poisoning by Bo's wife and ultimately the fall of Bo Xilai.

Cleansing the 'Military tigers' is another act analysts see Xi consolidating his power. The biggest catch has been diseased Xu Caihou, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission held for cash for rank. It has been reported that there are 34 more people being investigated for 'serious discipline breach.' Yang Jinshan, second in command of the Chengdu Military Division is another. There are other 'military tigers' who have benefited from Xu's position and are being investigated. Lt. General Gu Junshan, former deputy director of the logistics department of the PLA is just one of them.

The fallout of these campaigns is that the stories of 'a mistress behind every successful communist party official' has waned out, signifying the impact. The stories of jilted mistresses exposing the sexcapades and other wrong doing of the official, for example the case of Liu Tienan, former deputy chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission have almost disappeared. Liu was fired after his mistress revealed to media that he had embezzled \$200 million from banks.

Though there are cases such as Ling Jihua, former head of the central committee's United Front Work Department, and once top aide of former president Hu Jintao. His abuse of power was exposed in March 2012 when his son Ling Gu died in a Ferrari accident that has one nude and another semi nude girl on board. A debate set the social media ablaze as to how a son of a party official can afford \$800,000 car!

The intensity of the anti corruption drive in China is indeed great, and the people are supportive of President Xi's drive. Last year alone, the CCDI investigated 68 high ranking official, and punished more than 70,000 officials for graft. Since last January, it has also launched an official website, www.ccdi.gov.cn that allows netizens or the whistleblowers to interact with disciplinary officials. Wang Qishan, head of the CCDI has said that the site will be a bridge between the public and anti-corruption agencies. It appears that the drive will be a long drawn battle, and many in China fear that may well lead to troubles for President Xi Jinping.

Sino-US Rivalry in South China Sea: A New Normal? By Prof. B.R. Deepak

June 8, 2015 C3S Paper No. 0124/ 2015

South China Sea (SCS) which encompasses an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Taiwan, consisting of Dongsha, Xisha (known as Paracel), Zhongsha (also Huangyan in Chinese) and Nansha (Spratly) islands, has long been a bone of contention between China and Southeast Asian countries. Presently of these Zhongsha and Xisha are under the actual jurisdiction of China; Dongsha under the jurisdiction of Taiwan, and Nansha being fiercely contested by various countries in the region. The western, northeastern and southwestern areas of Nansha are under the actual jurisdiction of Vietnam, Philippine and Malaysia respectively. Of these islets 8 are controlled by China, 1 by Taiwan, 29 by Vietnam, 8 by Philippine, 5 by Malaysia and 2 by Brunei.

Various claimants have been passing legislations claiming certain islets. Last year in February, Philippines Senate and House of Representatives passed Baseline Bill and declared its ownership over Scarborough (Huangyan) island and some others in Spratly. A few months later Vietnam too passed its Maritime Law declaring indisputable sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands. China claims the entire South China Sea and has expressed outrage over these declarations, and further reinforced its claims by increasing the level of governance on the disputed islands; the establishment of Sansha city, a garrison in Zhongsha, inviting bids to explore resources in some of the disputed islands, and now the dredging and reclamation of some of the islets

and reefs are manifestations of China's show of strength and above all the assertion of its sovereignty in the region.

SCS reclamation row

Recent reclamation of islands and building soft infrastructure such as lighthouses on reclaimed islets has escalated not only into a war of words between the US and China but also flared tensions in the region as the US PACOM has initiated surveillance of Chinese reclamation activities and installation of mobile artillery vehicles in the reclaimed reefs and shoals. The US believes that China is fortifying these areas and may threaten the regional stability. Conversely China argues that the facilities are primarily for public services. The war of words was carried out all the way to Shang-Ri La Dialogue held in Singapore between 29 and 31 May 2015. The US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter reiterated the US position that it was within its right to protect the freedom of navigation and over flight, and called for an "immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants." Though Carter made reference to reclamation by others too, however, the criticism was primarily directed towards China, which he said, has reclaimed over 800 hectares, more than all other claimants combined and has done so in only the last 18 months. Though he did not directly accused China of moving artillery vehicles to the reclaimed areas, but was categorical when he said that they "oppose any further militarization of disputed features."

Rejecting Carter's contentions, China's Deputy Chief of General Staff, Admiral Sun Jianguo retorted that reclamation work in anyway does not affect the freedom of navigation and overflight, it is the US who in the garb of freedom of navigation wants to interfere in the dispute. Explaining the kind of reclamation activities China was undertaking, he said it has built an ocean survey station for the United Nations on Yongshu reef, and have initiated the construction of two multi-functional lighthouses on the Huayang and Chigua reefs with an objective to provide better international public services in the realms of maritime search and rescue operations, disaster prevention and relief, marine research, meteorological studies, environmental protection, navigation safety and fishery production etc. therefore, China's reclamation is "justified, legitimate and reasonable." Back in Beijing, Hua Chunying, the spokeswoman of Ministry of Foreign affairs reacted fiercely to Carter's criticism of China when she said no one has the right to dictate China's moves.

China's perceptions

First and foremost, China believes that apart from controlling most of the choke points in Indo-Pacific, the

US is also attempting to control other swathes of marine territory and vital lanes, so that the US has greater maneuverability on the one hand and contain China on the other. Conversely, Reclamation by China will deny that strategic space to the US. Moreover, in long run the Malacca Strait dilemma would be overcome by 'One Belt One Road' strategy, especially the Sino-Pak Economic Corridor; therefore, no wonder the US is becoming more aggressive in the SCS. Two, China considers the US as an outsider in the region as it is neither located in the region nor does it have any sovereignty disputes with China or any other country in the region, therefore, besides maintaining its hegemony and containing China, the US has no *locus standi* in the SCS. Three, China perceives the US as an instigator of the dispute encouraging countries like Philippines, Vietnam, Japan, and of late inciting South Korea and India to join the chorus in its policy of containing China. It feels that the US meddling will internationalize, complicate the situation and more importantly dent China image internationally. Four, China blames the US for having double standards, for the latter "chooses selective silence" toward those who illegally occupy territories claimed by China as was stated by Hua Chunying recently. It believes that the US has never objected to the reclamation activities of other claimants such as Vietnam which has 'occupied' maximum area in Spratly; asking *all claimants* to halt reclamation is just a lip service. Five, the US which is not the signatory of the UNCLOS, has on the contrary argued that the UNCLOS grants foreign ships and planes free access beyond a 12 nautical mile territorial limit. The PA-8 surveillance aircraft of the US has followed these norms, however, have been warned by China to leave the area as China claims that military flights cannot cross its 200 mile exclusive economic zone without its permission. The US fears that China's intentions are to make a *fait accompli* in the region by dredging and reclamation that will adversely impact on the freedom of navigation in the region. Had the US been a signatory to the UNCLOS, it might have taken China to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on the navigation issue. Six, China is aware that the US has maintained neutrality as far as the issue of sovereignty is concerned, therefore, has preferred to engage the claimants bilaterally, and has expressed its commitment towards the Code of Conduct negotiated by the ASEAN in 2002. However, if the US has not taken sides, it has also objected to China's sovereignty over these reclaimed reefs. This is evident when Carter told his audience at Shang-Ri La that "Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty." Seven, China is optimistic and confident about its success, and knows that most of the world including the US shares this viewpoint including some of its legal basis in the dispute, as was demonstrated by Barack Obama on June 1st before leaving to Jamaica. Obama said that "the truth is, is that China is going to be successful, it's big, it's powerful, its people are talented and they work hard and,

and it may be that some of their claims are legitimate." But he also warned China to stop "throwing elbows" in SCS. Finally, China is aware that the US would not like to confront China seriously in the region and will not cross the 12 nautical miles territorial limit for surveillance, if it does, there may be miscalculation and the stability in the region will be threatened.

A zero sum game?

Freedom of navigation may not be a serious an issue comparing the territorial claims, especially when more than 700 islets, reefs and shoals estimated to have oil reserves of 7 billion barrels and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are at stake. All the 9 ASEAN claimants are pitched against China and dependant on the US for diplomatic and military support. However, as the economic interests of these countries are highly intertwined with those of China, they may not like to confront China openly and alone. China has declared South China Sea as one of its core interests along with Tibet and Xinjiang where negotiations are out of question. The hard-line emanating from Zhongnanhai is that China will continue its reclamation activities and resist the US by various psychological, media, political and legal etc. warfare. As for the US, with its 'pivot to Asia' the US Navy would be testing China's claims in the South China Sea, and may cross the 12 nautical mile limit as well, which may force China to impose a new ADIZ over SCS on the lines of Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, and the rivalry may lead to mishaps and miscalculations.

Since China is also gradually transiting from a continental power to maritime power, the confrontation in the Indo-Pacific between the established global power and a rising one may be a new normal in coming times. China is aware of the asymmetry in force structure with the US irrespective of its second strike capability. Nevertheless, as China grows economically, the gaps are likely to be plugged in and new anti access/area denial weapons included its armor. While China is expected to engage the US as well as ASEAN at the highest level and sell its common development and win-win cooperation, nonetheless, it will also heighten its military preparedness for any eventuality and protracted contest with the US. If the push comes to shove, the US may abandon its present position on freedom of navigation, unimpeded passage for commercial shipping, which anyway is not tenable, in favor of greater economic concessions from China, for asking or threatening China to halt its reclamation activities will not work at all.

Modi's China visit: Can India and China think differently? By Prof. B. R. Deepak

May 12, 2015 C3S Paper No. 0109/ 2015

In the times of globalization and intertwining economic interests at regional and trans-regional levels, the cooperation and crisis management has become increasingly important for a sustainable domestic as well as external economic development and environment. No one denies the role played by confidence building measures (CBMs) in maintaining peace and tranquility along the border, avoiding conflict, and thus creating a congenial atmosphere for cooperation not only at bilateral level but also at regional and multilateral organizations. CBMs signed between India and China in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and latest Border Defense Cooperation Agreement of 2013 is a pointer as most of the border negotiations have been held under the aegis of these mechanisms. However, the sensitive nature of the border has also called for 'out of the box' resolutions, for these have fallen short of finding a solution.

From border to more complex issues

It was argued by most of the Indian and Chinese scholars that if there is an issue between India and China, it is the border issue. Padma Bhushan Prof. Ji Xianlin called it a 'dark cloud' shadowing the brilliance of two great civilizations. However, six decades down the independence, we have been overshadowed by more complex issues such as Sino-Pak entente, China's involvement in the POK, maritime security in the Indo-Pacific, and many more non-traditional security issues including the trade deficit and trans-border rivers. As far as the border is concerned, it has acquired complexity as both India and China has made *fait accompli* of the border, China in the western sector and India in the eastern sector especially when the issue is being discussed at the special representative level. In such a situation forget about the resolution, even defining the LAC could be a herculean task. The onus is on the Chinese side, if they want to have normal diplomatic and economic relations with India, it should be China in a hurry to resolve the issue not India, for it cast a negative shadow on China's image in India, and we cannot expect to have normal and robust economic engagement which is necessary for developing and sustaining economies on both side of the Himalayas. China has to take India on board for realizing the Asian Century, and also for rewriting the rules of global political architecture.

India an opportunity for China and vice versa

At the outset India needs a new and realistic farsighted foreign policy strategy that transcends conventional approaches. Conventional thinking has argued that we must not open for China be it the border regions or maritime domain. But did we succeed in preventing China making forays in our neighborhood? If not it's better to be the part of value chain rather than being a moot spectator from outside. Today, China is our largest trading partner in goods, albeit there are issues

pertaining to the trade deficit and market access to some of the Indian companies in China. While market access to the Indian company is well argued, the issue of Chinese investment in India has been seen with much skepticism and caution, but there are clear dividends. For example Chinese investment in telecom sector in India has successfully universalized mobile phone connectivity in India with affordable rates. It is not because of Nokia and Ericson, but because of the tough competition these companies received from Chinese telecom giants like Huawei and ZTE. Similarly, if India would like to build state of the art express ways, high speed railways, renewable energy capacity, even commercial ports and ship building with Chinese expertise, capital and competitive prices should be welcome.

'Belt and Road' initiative of China

So far India has maintained silence towards joining the initiative, for such initiatives have been construed as part of 'strategic encirclement' of India by security analysts and has clubbed with China's similar but smaller initiatives such as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the prospective Trans-Himalayan Economic Zone of Cooperation with Nepal and Bhutan, and the BCIM Economic Corridor that connects India's northeast to China's southwest, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Here again, if India tend to benefit from Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank's (AIIB) membership, it will also benefit from Chinese initiative as an insider rather than remaining outside the supply chain, notwithstanding the fact that projects along the 'Belt and Road' could be selected on case by case. China is apprehensive of the US-Japan-India alliance, therefore, it is keen to take India on board and sees 'Make in India', 'Act East Policy' and even project 'Mausam' as complementary to Chinese initiative.

The Chinese understands India's predicament and anxiety, nevertheless, are also open to the idea of establishing a new mechanism under the aegis of 'Belt and Road' initiative where all possible issues pertaining to the cooperation could be discussed. Secondly, in the face of soaring maritime ambitions of both the countries and their forays in Indo-Pacific, it is essential that both initiate a substantive maritime dialogue, which has remained a non starter even if the same was advocated in 2012. It is better if more such mechanisms are initiated between India and China so that trust is built which certainly will prove beneficial for finding solutions to various bilateral problems. For example between China and ASEAN there are over 1000 flights per week with an annual flow of around 5 million people. Can we think of such an economic integration and flow of people between us!

Can China support India's UN bid?

From Indian perspective while India could participate in Chinese 'Belt and Road' initiative, and be a partner in bilateral economic development, why cannot China show greater magnanimity to India's aspirations for a permanent membership to the UN Security Council? India has supported China's case in the UN over 30 times, and even after the 1962 war. China's support for India will create enormous goodwill for China in India and the bilateral relations could touch a new high, albeit everyone knows that the membership may never happen anytime sooner! However, we would be insensitive towards China's Japanese sensitivities if India pushes its case together with Japan, in turn we may not get that support.

Wider people to people exchanges

More and wider people to people contacts and a relaxed visa regime not only for tourists and business people but also for students and academicians is need of the hour. The media to media relations that have generally been neglected need to be strengthened and direct access to news channels in either country is another possibility. In this regard, India needs to increase its reporters' strength in China with the knowledge of Chinese, so as the Indian public get more and objective news stories about different aspects of China.

From bilateralism to multilateralism

It is owing to CBMs that India and China have struck some real convergence of interests on issues such as climate change, democratization of international financial institutions through multilateral forums such as Russia-China-India Strategic Triangle, Brazil; Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS); Brazil-South Africa-India-China (BASIC); the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); East Asian Summits (EAS); G 20 and other multilateral forums such Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). India and China have also initiated dialogue on terrorism and Afghanistan. The multilateral cooperation has been used to strengthen the bilateral relations by both the countries, and both are working towards raising the level of bilateral relationship with the hope of creating larger stakes in each other's economic systems through complementarities and interdependence. Since everyone talks about the strikingly similar dynamics of Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping, we will have to wait and watch if they can think differently and change the dynamics of India-China relations.

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